Soliciting Donations 

I spent my entire summer, outside of my 9-5, designing my website and social media pages, which took so much time that I don’t feel comfortable even giving a number to it. I assume that this is one of those tasks that’s worth outsourcing if you have the money but given that I had some (albeit limited) experience in website design and no money to start, I built everything in-house. I felt really good about the design, so good that I decided to announce my candidacy publicly pretty early on. At the time, I was one of only two candidates to announce on the Democrat side of the aisle. 

This was only the beginning of unwritten, black-box advice only available if you are privileged enough to know someone who has had experience running or serving in public office. 

I was familiar with the concept of press releases, but only in theory—not in practice. So I met with my team, which was comprised of about 6 friends, only two of which had experience assisting in a campaign. We drafted what we thought was a reasonable press release that tried its best to embody objectivity and sent it to a reporter who covered Wisconsin politics. The online reception was, put lightly, not good. And random trolls on the internet weren’t the only ones—right after I announced one of my mentors told me that it’s important not to declare your candidacy until you have a couple of big donors lined up. I was off to a great start already. This was only the beginning of unwritten, black-box advice only available if you are privileged enough to know someone who has had experience running or serving in public office. 

Of course, I knew I had to set-up my donation form, even a political novice would know that the current state of elections requires this. In order to do so, I first needed to open a political campaign bank account. Political campaign accounts are not as easily opened as a commercial account. I found little information online about what companies even offered accounts of this variety. The only information I could find was a Federal Election Committee (FEC) requirement that it be national bank, state bank, or FDIC- or NCUA-insured institution. I didn’t even know what the NCUA was…

So I began calling banks to ask about political campaign accounts. I arranged a meeting with Bank of America, whose representative was confused that I was running in Wisconsin while living in Massachusetts—as if I hadn’t heard that enough already. Anyway, they quoted me $40/month for mere maintenance of the account, not to mention transaction and operation fees. This didn’t seem to be the most sustainable option, so I did some more research. 

I found Amalgamated Bank, an institution that advertised their successful involvement in various Democratic campaigns. I scheduled a zoom call with their representative and concluded that they were the cheapest option, at $5/month and only about $.25 per deposit after a certain amount. I signed up for an account and was pleasantly surprised at the level of advice and technical assistance they were willing to give me, probably their least profitable client. Then came actually getting those deposits.

For our donating platform, I chose to go with Act-Blue, a 501(c)(3) that provides organizations that “share [their] values” a donation collection process “for no cost besides a 3.95% processing fee on donations.” WinRed, the conservative counterpart, imposes a similar processing fee and ideological restriction to those who want to fundraise on their platform. 

These platforms are contentious for political and non-political reasons alike. Specific concerns about the lack of credit card verification for smaller-money donations have been raised against ActBlue, for example. More broadly, despite these non-profits’ claims of elevating democratic voice, their business model gives them the final decision on which campaigns get fundraising access and which are shunned to another, much-less known platform.

Additionally, even though they processed over $3.5 billion 2022’s election cycle, which likely led to over $138 million in fees paid to the non-profit, ActBlue laid off 17% of its unionized workforce before exploring other alternatives like wage reductions with the union. They cited similar workforce reductions at corporate giants like Microsoft, Facebook, and Google, signaling that the nonprofit committed to democracy is exceedingly similar to other for-profit enterprises in the tech world.

The platforms claim, but ultimately fail to compete with big donors and PAC spending, which accounted for the vast majority of Presidential donations since 2015 and dominates in nearly every state since then.

In theory, entities like ActBlue might help sooth some of the ailments created by the Citizens United Supreme Court Decision. Yet the platforms are still a product of an electoral system that values the propensity to gather donations over political agenda and policy preferences. Furthermore, the platforms claim, but ultimately fail to compete with big donors and PAC spending, which accounted for the vast majority of Presidential donations since 2015 and dominates in nearly every state since then. Thus, one could argue that the platforms obfuscate the need for deep, systemic reform—cloaking their desire to syphon some percentage of donations, even a small amount, with the valance of democratic ideals. And all-the-while existing in industries and responding to the profit-incentives therein.

Rolling it Forward 

Getting a ‘Donate’ button doesn’t fill the bank account. After a tumultuous launch and subsequent sprint to post on social media, we tried our hand at raising funds. With every donation that rolled in, I felt lost on how to spend it. I felt immense pressure to use the funds wisely, a pressure that I’m sure is unique to small dollar fundraising. My research led me to two important purchases: federal compliance consultant and voter data acquisition.

In order to comply with federal law, individual donations must be tracked and reported to the Federal Election Committee. Given the complexity of reporting requirements, most strategists recommend outsourcing this task. But the price tag of compliance experts is extraordinarily high. Reporting is required quarterly for congressional races, so many compliance software/experts charge on the same cycle. The few experts we talked were way too expensive—most hovering around $5,000/quarter, so with the help of an attorney on our staff we ventured to do this part by ourselves. Given the dearth of donors and the brevity of the campaign, it was pretty manageable. But were we to have many smaller donations over a longer period of time, it quickly would have become untenable.

One of the more under-reported topic of elections is access to donor and voter data. Although the industry is a cacophony of state and federal laws, it’s pretty simple to understand. As a candidate you are expected to have two goals: 1) get donations and 2) get exposure. You can obviously accomplish one or both of these goals by knocking on doors, commonly referred to as canvasing. Less evidently, candidates can now gain funding by building a digital following/network to tap for donations. Social media presents one avenue of building this network, but the other avenue is called “voter files.”

Voter files are exactly what they sound like—a breakdown of an individual’s phone number, email address, physical address, the method of contact they are most likely to answer, etc. Importantly, however, they are also “donor files,” including information like the amount a candidate should ask for, important issues to touch on in your pitch, and other seemingly invasive information that might be useful in getting the individual to donate to your campaign. When amassed into databases, these “voter files” are absolutely necessary for a candidate to be successful in today’s elections.

The databases are carefully constructed by commercial organizations who go on to rent them out to promising candidates. Voter files have been around, in a less aggregated fashion, since at least the early 2000s. Obama’s 2008 campaign used one of the first databases called “VoteBuilder,” helping him dominate the contest that was the most expensive (at the time) presidential race in US history. In the early 2010s, one of the leading campaign compliance software companies shifted its focus towards leveraging its Democratic connections in providing voter data and web hosting services. NGP VAN was born through a merger of NGP Software and Voter Action Network, both of which had deep Democratic connections. While other services boast a history of over 50 years, NGP VAN is special because of its connection to the Democratic party, more of which will be discussed below. 

Similar to the fundraising platforms, the company databases are usually bifurcated by party. The price of access is based on the invisible free market that strangles us all. One can assume, however, that as the cost of elections has risen, so too has the cost for voter files. L2 data, a prominent voter data company, advertised a rate of $.025/file in 2017. For the 3rd District of Wisconsin, that would mean one would have to raise about $18,000 before they were able to get access to data for everyone in the district—before they were able to roll it forward. And that is not to mention the additional files for individuals outside of the district, which is extraordinarily important since some studies indicate that 63% of House funding comes from outside of the district.

For the 3rd District of Wisconsin, that would mean one would have to raise about $18,000 before they were able to get access to data for everyone in the district—before they were able to roll it forward.

So I arranged a meeting with a prominent campaign data company. This was to account for the $650 monthly fee for access to their constituent relationship management (CRM) and federal disclosure program (more on this later). Access to their email services, which allows candidates to send mass emails and track the data associated with it, was an additional $315 per month. To manage fundraising events and growing lists was an additional $400-$500, depending on the level of service. In this conversation, the representative told me, rather pointedly, that I should not reach back out to them until I had already raised at least $10,000.

My mentor’s advice in this moment rang even more true. To be sure, in terms of political fundraising, this is not a significant amount. Even still, this arbitrary, corporate-controlled barrier to entering a political race in a meaningful way limits who might be a primary candidate and, ultimately, who might be serving in our country’s public offices. This threshold disfavors young people, who are unlikely to have the stockpile of capital required to roll fundraising forward; progressives, whose message is unlikely to appeal to wealthy/corporate donors; women, who have historically been less likely to be donated to (although this trend may have recently reversed); and individuals of minority groups, who are less likely to have money to contribute to candidates and less likely to receive contributions from white donors.

If all of this corporate gatekeeping to important voter data wasn’t enough, state political parties have an equally prominent role. State parties, including the Wisconsin Democratic Party, have amassed their own bank of data which they package through private companies to candidates. NGP VAN is especially prevalent in this domain because of its widespread use within Democratic campaigns.

Even still, this arbitrary, corporate-controlled barrier to entering a political race in a meaningful way limits who might be a primary candidate and, ultimately, who might be serving in our country’s public offices.

Like many, however, the company does not exist without controversy. During the 2016 Presidential primaries, the platform, under direction of the Democratic National Convention (DNC), generated criticism because of its actions towards the campaign of Bernie Sanders. A software glitch allowed the Sander’s campaign to access the records of Hillary Clinton’s team, which resulted in the accessing and saving of his opponent’s data. In response, NGP VAN revoked Sanders’ VAN access, claiming that it “was not to punish the Sanders campaign,” but only to correct the software issue.

Even if one is ambivalent on the motives behind this particular fiasco, political party control intersecting with corporate power in this manner is deeply problematic. One might be able to argue that party gatekeeping serves a valuable purpose instead of a nefarious one. They might argue that political parties serve the role of distancing authoritarians and appealing to the moderate side of the party. But over time, the parties have abdicated those responsibilities—with representatives Marjorie Taylor Greene as a prime example. Even without these examples, unchallenged political parties leverage monopoly power over the selection of candidates, creating a pool of political leaders that are increasingly pro-status-quo and indebted to the parties that deemed them worthy of support.

The Nature of Fundraising 

Given my life circumstances (being in Boston and all), the lack of fundraising was the nail in my first campaign’s coffin. The experience, nevertheless, made me think about the nature of fundraising in general. In its current form, fundraising forces smaller candidates to be a marketer and cash-cow first and foremost. Larger campaigns—ones that involve a wealthy candidate or represent wealthy interests, on the other hand, can outsource fundraising to hired professionals.

While individual voters might be inundated with plea after plea to give whatever they can to, on average, a Democrat unlikely to deliver meaningful change to their life, business interests are pouring money into the campaigns of religious zealots and culture war instigators so that they will save money on their taxes.

In yet another way, having to solicit individual donations inherently favors conservative ideologies and the status-quo. While individual voters might be inundated with plea after plea to give whatever they can to, on average, a Democrat unlikely to deliver meaningful change to their life, business interests are pouring money into the campaigns of religious zealots and culture war instigators so that they will save money on their taxes. Those committed against taking PAC or SuperPAC money are further disadvantaged by the way our system is constructed, as they are forced to rely on single donors with lower maximum contribution limits and even more encumbered by the costs of buying data and hiring/recruiting volunteers to fundraise.

Although there are some high-profile cases of non-PAC candidates climbing the summit, if we were to reinvent the system that exists, one would be foolish to suggest that we would choose to construct it the same way. As they originated, SuperPACs were publicly viewed as anti-democratic. It is unlikely that their perception has changed dramatically since then.

Is Change Possible? 

It is true that many of the issues in the U.S. are unique to our legal system. Even still, European countries have drawn lessons from the various methods of “micro-targeting and data-driven campaigning” that plague the American election system. They have developed similar practices of “sell[ing] the range of software applications, for both database and mobile environments” to capitalize on this accumulation of data. Still, the capability of corporation domination of election fundraising is unique to this domestic institution.

For all of the lamenting I’ve done here, I have to at least provide some solutions. The most obvious solution is to pass a federal law overturning Citizen’s United. This would require federal legislators to vote against their own interests, making it one of the most unlikely scenarios as well. Alternatively nominating judges to the Supreme Court might overturn this disastrous, undemocratic precedent. Most solutions to this problem do, however, require federal action, so I wouldn’t discount this possibility entirely.

Unchallenged political parties leverage monopoly power over the selection of candidates, creating a pool of political leaders that are increasingly pro-status-quo and indebted to the parties that deemed them worthy of support.

Another possibility is to treat individual donor data as public record, rather than allowing privatization of it, or outlawing the accumulation of it entirely. Although the first measure would severely implicate privacy considerations (not to mention how it would only increase PAC and SuperPAC contributions under the Citizen’s United regime), allowing smaller campaigns to access the same information would make primaries less nepotistic and would lower the barriers to enter into an election. The second measure is likely to create black markets for data and advantage those who are willing to break the rules and can afford mechanisms to avoid getting caught.

Alternatively, public funding of federal campaigns has received support from nonpartisan groups that seek to preserve democracy. Voucher systems similarly allow citizens to choose how public funds are allocated towards preferred candidates, which accomplishes similar aims of actually democratizing the process of democracy. Older studies have found that collective action remains a barrier to entry for tax funded federal elections. Voucher programs, however, have been shown to diversify “donor pool[s] to better reflect [a] city’s population,” including elevating the participation of minority groups and young people, and increase the number of candidates within local elections. Even still, this program was largely funded by property taxes, so a solution of this variety would still require voters to get on board—something that has yet to happen on a large scale.

I write all this not to say that I would be in public office if not for the way elections are designed in the United States. I was not prepared to run, I lacked vital campaign experience, and there were a myriad of other factors as to why I eventually conceded. But our systems are fundamentally flawed—and in a purposeful manner. Our electoral system, like most facets of our society, continues to favor old, wealthy interests just as it has since its founding. From the buying of data to the nature of fundraising, money in politics has become the default. Many changes are needed to correct these faults and the existence of our democratic institutions, however undemocratic they currently are, depend on it.